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Are Secondary Considerations Still “Secondary”?: 
An Examination of Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Five Years After ksr
by John Paul Putney1
1Judge Learned Hand was among the first 
stout advocates of secondary considerations2—also 
known as objective indicia of nonobviousness—as 
a necessary safeguard against inherent hindsight 
bias in determining nonobviousness3 as part of a 
necessarily after-the-fact inquiry.  The Supreme 
1.  J.D. Candidate (2014), University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law; M.P.I.A. Candidate (2014), University of Pittsburgh Graduate 
School of Public and International Affairs; M.M., New England 
Conservatory of Music; B.A., Chapman University; B.M. Chapman 
University.
2.  Learned Hand referred to secondary considerations as the 
“history of the art”: 
[T]he most reliable test is to look at the 
situation before and after it appears . . . .  Courts, 
made up of laymen as they must be, are likely 
either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties 
in making new and profitable discoveries in fields 
with which they cannot be familiar; and, so far as it 
is available, they had best appraise the originality 
involved by the circumstances which preceded, 
attended and succeeded the appearance of the 
invention. . . .  We have repeatedly declared that 
in our judgment this approach is more reliable then 
prior conclusions drawn from vaporous, and almost 
inevitably self-dependent, general propositions.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 
937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946); see also, e.g., Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 
501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 
F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 
F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942); Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch 
Textile Mach., 87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1937); Ruben Condenser 
Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1935).  Judge Hand’s 
strong praise for secondary considerations was animated in part by his 
contempt for other tests:
When [secondary considerations are] not at 
hand, we are forced to fabricate a standard as best 
we can from our naive ignorance; but that is so 
unsatisfactory an expedient that resort to it should 
be as sparing as possible.  In either case, whether 
we have evidence, or must grope unguided, those 
putatively objective principles by which it is so 
often supposed that invention can be detected 
are illusion, and the product of unconscious 
equivocation; the inexorable syllogism which 
appears to compel the conclusion is a sham.
B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935).  
3.  The nonobvious requirement was codified by Congress in 
1952. 35 U.S.C. § 103.  The obviousness inquiry supplanted the 
imprecise common law “invention” inquiry.  See Graham v. John Deer 
Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
Court confirmed the inferential value of secondary 
considerations in Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kansas City,4 agreeing with Learned Hand that such 
considerations are “more susceptible [to] judicial 
treatment than are the highly technical facts often 
present in patent litigation.”5  Over forty years later, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the test laid out in 
Graham (including secondary considerations) in 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,6 leading some 
observers to speculate that secondary considerations 
would become a more important inquiry in patent 
litigation.7  
Five years after KSR, however, it appears 
courts are still unclear on how much weight to 
give secondary considerations as part of the overall 
obviousness determination, though the Federal 
Circuit is insistent that objective indicia must be 
considered if present.  At times, the Federal Circuit 
has viewed secondary considerations as “secondary” 
in probative value and has been quick to discount 
evidence of objective indicia as insufficient to tip 
the scales of nonobviousness.  Other Federal Circuit 
4.  383 U.S. 1 (1966).
5.  Id. at 35-36.  The Court specifically mentions “commercial 
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.” leaving 
room for additional considerations.  Id.
6.  550 U.S. 398 (2007).
7.  See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic 
Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 wm. & mary L. rev. 
989, 1004-07 (2008) (“As the legal rules that fight hindsight bias, such 
as the TSM test, are trimmed back . . . patentees will want to rely more 
on . . . secondary considerations . . . .”); Amanda Wieker, Secondary 
Considerations Should Be Given Increased Weight in Obviousness 
Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex World, 
17 Fed. cIr. b.J. 665, 681-83 (2008) (suggesting reasoned decisions 
based on explicit secondary considerations can avert “obviousness 
opinions based entirely on . . . vague and imprecise notions of 
common sense and creativity . . . .”); Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary 
Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective 
Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 n.y.u. L. rev. 2070,  2090-102 
(2011) (examining the effect of KSR on subsequent Federal Circuit 
decisions through early 2010 that involved secondary considerations); 
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: 
An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 
Fed. cIr. b.J. 369, 378-81 (2011) (suggesting that KSR made finding 
an invention obvious easier for patent challengers).  But see Eli M. 
Sheets, Arguing Secondary Considerations After KSR: Proceed with 
Caution, 21 Fed. cIr. b.J. 1, 16-22 (2011-2012) (suggesting secondary 
considerations have been relegated to “lame-duck” status following 
KSR).
46 Fall 2012
panels have esteemed secondary considerations 
as the “most probative and cogent evidence in the 
record.”8  As the Federal Circuit wrestles internally 
with the probative value of objective indicia, 
practitioners are aware that courts tend to recite 
and rely on secondary considerations when finding 
patents nonobvious, but marginalize or disparage 
them when finding patents obvious and invalid.9
Part I of this article reviews the genesis of 
the nonobviousness requirement by examining its 
predecessor, the landmark Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the requirement, and the procedural 
rules that have shaped the nonobviousness 
inquiry.  Juxtaposed against the development of 
the inquiry are the shifts in the role of secondary 
considerations up until KSR.  
Part II of this article reviews the Federal 
Circuit’s treatment of secondary considerations 
in the five intervening years since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in KSR and finds that secondary 
considerations are still often treated as secondary 
in stature, but with some recent indications of 
forthcoming change.  It next turns attention to the 
nexus requirement as a flashpoint of interpretive 
conflict.  Looking closely at the established 
scheme of burden shifting in the nexus inquiry, 
this article examines the inconsistencies in the 
application of the rules governing the shifting 
burdens in post-KSR Federal Circuit case law.  In 
addition, the article notes the opaque distinctions 
between the nexus tests that serve to obfuscate the 
nexus inquiry and undermine the probative value 
of secondary considerations.
Part III of this article concludes by noting 
a persistent divide on the nexus test and lingering 
disagreement over the value of secondary 
considerations in the face of Supreme Court 
silence on the topic.
I. Secondary conSIderatIonS and the   
 nonobvIouSneSS requIrement
 a. the PrecurSor to the   
  nonobvIouSneSS requIrement
Patents are intended “to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by 
incentivizing innovation through short-term 
8.  Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
9.  See 2-5 donaLd S. chISum, chISum on PatentS § 5.05, 
5-894 (Matthew Bender ed., 2012).
“exclusive rights” (i.e., a qualified statutory 
monopoly),10 thereby affording the inventor 
a commercial benefit.  In 1850, however, the 
Supreme Court clarified that not every creation 
would qualify as a patentable invention.11  Rather, 
“[a] degree of skill and ingenuity [ ] constitute 
essential elements of every invention.”12  Hence, 
where either element is lacking, a patent is 
invalid.  In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,13 the Supreme 
Court affirmed an invalidity finding because the 
substitution of clay or porcelain knobs for more 
common door knob materials did not require 
“more ingenuity and skill . . . than were possessed 
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the 
business.”14  Although the inquiry was phrased in 
terms of “invention” and “inventor,” Hotchkiss 
is the genesis of the concept of nonobviousness, 
which Congress codified as part of the Patent 
Act of 1952,15 unifying and supplanting the more 
nebulous “invention” standard.16
 B. Secondary conSIderatIonS PrIor  
  to § 103
Secondary considerations, too, predate the 
Congressional codification of the nonobviousness 
requirement.  In Smith v. Goodyear Dental 
Vulcanite Co.,17 while considering the validity of 
a patent for artificial teeth sets cast in vulcanized 
rubber, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[m]
ore was needed for [the invention] than simply 
mechanical judgment and good taste.  Were it 
not so, hard rubber would doubtless[ly] have 
been used in the construction of artificial sets 
of teeth, gums, and plates long before [the 
inventor] applied for his patent.”18  Moreover, 
the Court noted “eminent dentists and experts 
. . . uniformly speak of [the invention] as [new 
10.  U.S. conSt. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
11.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).  
12.  Id.
13.  52 U.S. 248 (1850).  
14.  Id. at 267.
15.  Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 
(1952).  The nonobviousness requirement—codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
103—provides: “A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences 
between the subject matter [of the patent] and the prior art are such 
that the subject matter . . . would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . 
.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
16.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 14 
(1966).
17.  93 U.S. 486 (1876).
18.  Id. at 494-95.
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and most valuable]”19 and as having created 
a “revolution in dental practice, [with] many 
thousands of operators . . . using it in preference 
to older devices.”20  Notwithstanding Hotchkiss’ 
holding that substitution was not “invention,”21 
this combination of long-felt need, commercial 
success, and industry praise sufficed to “justify the 
inference that what [the patentee] accomplished 
was . . . invention.”22
Courts, however, gave secondary 
considerations widely varied treatment.23  In the 
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand criticized 
the “misty” nonobviousness requirement as 
inviting judges “to substitute our ignorance 
for [] acquaintance with the subject of those 
who [are] familiar with it.”24  Nonetheless, he 
highlighted “sign posts” like long-felt need, failure 
of others, and commercial success that could 
guide the inquiry.25  Conversely, other courts 
quickly disposed of secondary considerations as 
“a relevant consideration” “in a close case,” but 
incapable of validating patents for “device[s] 
lack[ing] invention.”26 
 C.  InterPretIng § 103’S    
  nonobvIouSneSS command: the  
  Graham anaLySIS
Enacted in 1952, the nonobviousness 
requirement, as embodied in § 103,27 was intended 
to have a “stabilizing effect and minimize great 
departures which have appeared in some cases.”28  
In the seminal Supreme Court case on the then-
newly-minted nonobvious requirement, Graham 
19.  Id. at 495.
20.  Id.
21.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 253 (1850).
22.  Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495 
(1876).
23.  See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study 
of Legal Innovation, 86 tex. L. rev. 1, 33-43 (2007) (tracing 
evolution of the standard of invention); Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives 
on Innovation, 76 caLIF. L. rev. 803, 817-18 (1988) (outlining 
divergent standards vis-à-vis evidence of commercial success prior 
to § 103); see generally robert P. mergeS & John F. duFFy, Patent 
Law and PoLIcy: caSeS and materIaLS 629-30 (4th ed. 2007).
24.  Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960).
25.  Id. 
26.  Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply 
Co., 332 F.2d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 1964).
27.  The nonobviousness requirement, codified in 35 U.S.C. § 
103, was created by the Patent Act of 1952.  Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 
Stat. 792 (1952).
28.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 
(1966) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394).
v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,29 the Court laid 
out a deceptively simple inquiry including three 
primary considerations: (1) the scope and content 
of the prior art; (2) differences between the prior 
art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art.30  The three 
primary considerations echo the language of § 
103.31  
In addition, the Court cautiously 
endorsed secondary considerations that “might 
be utilized” and “may have relevancy” as indicia 
of nonobviousness.32  Describing the judiciary as 
“most ill-fitted to . . . the technological duties [of] 
patent litigation,”33 the Court agreed with Judge 
Learned Hand that objective indicia are “more 
susceptible [to] judicial treatment.”34  As a “guard 
against . . . hindsight,” secondary considerations 
serve to “resist the temptation to read into the 
prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.”35  
Despite this lofty proclamation, the Court pithily 
concluded that the objective indicia in the case 
at issue were insufficient to “tip the scales of 
patentability.”36  The conflicting assessments of 
secondary considerations in Graham failed to 
definitively settle the question of their evidentiary 
value, especially as compared to the first three 
factors of the four-part Graham analysis.
 D.  ShaPIng the Graham anaLySIS  
  wIth the tSm teSt
In the decades leading up to KSR, the 
Federal Circuit developed a strict standard—the 
Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation (TSM) test37—
which it applied “rigorously” to “[guard] against 
hindsight-based obviousness analysis.”38  The 
TSM test required a “clear and particular,” if not 
29.  383 U.S. 1 (1966).
30.  Id. at 16.
31.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
32.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
33.  Id. at 36 (citing Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60 (1943)).
34.  Id. at 35-36.
35.  Id. at 36.
36.  Id. 
37.  The TSM test originated in the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor, the United States Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals,  see In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961), 
but was developed further by the Federal Circuit in the decades 
leading up to KSR.  See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
38.  Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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“express,” teaching, suggestion or motivation 
to combine two (or more) references to produce 
the subject of the patent being challenged.39  
Although not intended to supplant the Graham 
analysis, the TSM test became a dominant method 
for defining what would have been “obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art”—i.e., the first 
three of the four Graham factors.40  Successful 
patent challengers who satisfied the TSM test 
established a “prima facie” case of obviousness, 
after which courts turned to the fourth Graham 
factor—secondary considerations—to “rebut” the 
prima facie obviousness case.41  While the TSM 
test gave shape to the primary considerations 
under the Graham analysis, it did not address the 
probative value of secondary considerations.  It 
did, however, separate objective indicia from the 
first three factors of the Graham analysis, inviting 
courts to treat them as conceptually distinct even 
where such distinction could be seen as logically 
suspect.42
 
 E.  deFInIng the evIdentIary vaLue  
  oF obJectIve IndIcIa aFter   
  Graham
Objective indicia were mostly considered 
individually after Graham (i.e., each individual 
secondary consideration was considered 
separately).43  Their relative weight, however, 
remained unclear.44  Far from having binding 
effect, several Federal Circuit panels found that 
39.  While the references need not expressly teach that the 
disclosure contained therein should be combined with another, the 
showing of combinability must be “clear and particular.”  In re 
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999; see also Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital 
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
40.  See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.  
41.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 
1369, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
42.  See generally discussion infra Part I.F.
43.  Courts have considered numerous objective indicia: 
long-felt need, failure of others, success by others, commercial 
success, commercial failure, commercial acquiescence (licensing), 
professional approval, industry skepticism, teaching away, 
unexpected results, copying, laudatory statements by the infringer, 
difficulty/ease of PTO process, near-simultaneous invention.  See 
generally chISum, supra note 9, § 5.05.
44.  The Ecolochem court noted that Graham named only 
three secondary considerations (commercial success, long-felt 
need, failure—or lack thereof—of others) and proceeded to give 
the “most weight” “in the instant case” to the three named indicia, 
even though additional widely-recognized indicia were also present: 
copying, teaching away, and simultaneous invention.  Ecolochem v. 
S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
secondary considerations can simply “not be 
compelling enough”45 even in “a close [case].”46  
Other panels found that “extensive secondary 
considerations” may rebut obviousness, at least 
where the court seems unconvinced a prima facie 
case exists.47  
As an additional hurdle to establishing 
nonobviousness, the Federal Circuit has also 
imposed a “nexus” requirement that requires 
parties to connect the evidence of objective 
indicia (e.g., commercial success) to the merits of 
the patented subject matter, as opposed to other 
factors (e.g., a ritzy advertising campaign).  This 
requirement, which was also advocated by Judge 
Learned Hand,48 can prove onerous for patent 
holders to satisfy.49
45.  Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 
953, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46.  Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1381.
47.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 
1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
48.  See Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Mach., 
87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1937) (“[Objective indicia are] the best 
test when . . . available.  But it is a dangerous test to apply, and will 
lead one astray unless jealously watched.”), aff’d, 302 U.S. 490 
(1938).
49.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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 F.  ksr and the rebuke oF the   
  FederaL cIrcuIt
In the lead up to KSR, the TSM test drew 
ample criticism from observers who linked an 
overly strict application of the test to a decline 
in the standard of patentability.50  Affirming 
the continued relevancy of the Graham factors 
(including secondary considerations “where 
appropriate”), in KSR International v. Teleflex 
Inc.,51 the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the rigid 
[TSM] approach” which failed to allow for 
“common sense.”52  As for objective indicia, 
the Court, much as it did in Graham, pithily 
concluded: “[The patentee] has not shown . . . any 
secondary factors to dislodge the [obviousness] 
determination . . . .”53  Quickly disposing of the 
objective indicia, the Court again passed on the 
opportunity to provide instruction on how much 
weight to afford objective indicia.
Shortness of shrift, however, did not deter 
some commentators from predicting a rise in the 
importance of secondary considerations in the 
obviousness inquiry for patentees.54  Indeed, many 
commentators agreed that KSR made obviousness 
easier to establish by lowering the threshold to 
establish a prima facie case of obviousness.55  
50.  See, e.g., natIonaL reSearch councIL oF the natIonaL 
academy, a Patent SyStem For the 21St century 87-94 (Stephen 
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) 
(asserting the law of obviousness needs to change); FederaL trade 
commISSIon, to Promote InnovatIon: the ProPer baLance oF 
comPetItIonS and Patent Law and PoLIcy 8-15 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ innovationrpt.pdf (noting numerous 
commentators critical of the law of obviousness); Katherine J. 
Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview 
and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 berkeLey tech. 
L. J. 1293, 1329–38 (2006) (attributing a “patent explosion” to 
the decline of patentability standards); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 
wake ForeSt L. rev. 827, 833 (1999) (noting lowered obviousness 
bar for biotechnology); Robert W. Harris, The Emerging Primacy 
of “Secondary Considerations” as Validity Ammunition: Has 
the Federal Circuit Gone Too Far?, 71 J. Pat. & trademark 
oFF. Soc’y 185, 201 (1989) (suggesting a trend towards favoring 
patentability).  But see Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The 
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of 
the Law of Obviousness, 85 tex. L. rev. 2051 (2007); Gregory N. 
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 ohIo St. 
L.J. 1391 (2006).
51.  550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
52.  Id. at 415-21. 
53.  Id. at 426.
54.  See sources cited supra note 7.
55.  See Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for 
Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law 
Following KSR, 20 Fed. cIr. b.J. 369, 378-81 (2011) (suggesting 
Patentees would naturally become more reliant on 
secondary considerations to rebut.  
Interestingly, the TSM test persists in the 
aftermath of KSR.  Noting that only the rigid TSM 
test was expressly rejected, the Federal Circuit 
has, at times, applied a more flexible version of the 
test.56  Moreover, Federal Circuit panels continue 
to contextualize the obviousness inquiry in terms 
of a prima facie case of obviousness, looking to 
secondary considerations only as rebuttal evidence 
to an obviousness case.  Thus, even without 
mentioning the TSM test by name, it continues to 
influence the obviousness inquiry.  
To the extent the TSM test continues 
to reinforce shaping the obviousness inquiry 
as a two-pronged test (i.e., prima facie case 
of obviousness and secondary considerations 
rebuttal), its persistence post-KSR presents two 
issues.  First, the diverse set of commonly accepted 
“secondary considerations” is not analytically 
analogous.  In other words, while commercial 
success is clearly circumstantial evidence 
(operating by inference), unexpected results are 
much less clearly so because their probative value 
derives almost exclusively from the state of the 
art at the time of the discovery.57  Nonetheless, the 
procedural structure encouraged by the remnant 
TSM test relegates both to a distinct rebuttal class.  
Second, to the extent objective indicia 
reveal, as Learned Hand suggested, the “history 
of the art”—i.e., the heart and soul of the Graham 
analysis—to separate them out into a distinct 
category is artificial and can be problematic, 
even if procedurally expedient.  Doing so invites 
impact of KSR made finding an invention obvious easier for patent 
challengers); Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, Combinations, and 
“Common Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision 
Is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness Determinations in 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 n. ky. L. rev. 
281, 285-86 (2008) (observing that KSR seemingly makes 
obviousness easier to establish); Diane Christine Renbarger, Note, 
Putting the Brakes on Drugs: The Impact of KSR v. Teleflex on 
Pharmaceutical Patenting Strategies, 42 ga. L. rev. 905, 908-09 
(2008) (suggesting KSR may have heightened the nonobviousness 
standard for pharmaceutical inventions).
56.  See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 
1172 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. 
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)), 
supplemented sub nom. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 275 
F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, 
Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Ortho-McNeil 
Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364-65 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) and Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
57.  See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 775 F. 
Supp. 2d 985, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
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courts to make the precise error the Federal 
Circuit repeatedly overturns: coming to a decision 
about obviousness before meaningfully weighing 
secondary considerations.
 G.  FaILure to conSIder Secondary  
  conSIderatIonS IS reverSIbLe  
  error
The qualified language of Graham does not 
mandate that courts consider objective indicia.58  
Established in 1982,59 and charged with appellate 
jurisdiction for virtually all patent claims,60 the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified 
early on: “evidence rising out of the so-called 
‘secondary considerations’ must always when 
present be considered en route to a determination 
of obviousness . . . .”61  Consistently portraying 
the Graham analysis as a four-part test, the 
Federal Circuit is hawkish when it comes to lower 
courts’ decisions that have ignored secondary 
considerations.62  Even where courts explicitly 
consider secondary considerations, but do so only 
after reaching a “conclusion” on obviousness, they 
may be overturned.63  Even if the Graham court’s 
“tip the scales” language seemed ambivalent, 
the Federal Circuit clarified: “[Secondary 
58.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966).  The language of Graham is indisputably permissive and 
not imperative: “secondary considerations . . . might be utilized . . . 
.  [They] may have relevancy.”  Id.
59.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
60.  28 U.S.C. § 1295 vests the Federal Circuit with “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over most matters arising under patent law.  However, 
where the patent claims arise as counterclaims by a defendant, 
other Courts of Appeals may adjudicate patent counterclaims.  See 
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. Inc., 535 U.S. 
826, 833-34 (2002).
61.  Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
62.  See, e.g., TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing lower court for the second time 
for “summarily dismiss[ing] evidence of secondary considerations” 
and ordering reassignment to another judge).  However, failure 
to cite secondary considerations, alone, may not be reversible 
error where they “cannot overcome the strong evidence of 
nonobviousness.” See Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 437 F. 
App’x 897, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Aug. 1, 2011); 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
63.  In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release 
Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(reversing the district court because it reached a “conclusion” 
regarding obviousness before explicitly considering—and 
rejecting—the objective indicia evidence proffered by the 
patentee), reh’g en banc denied (Jul. 25, 2012) [hereinafter In re 
Cyclobenzaprine].
considerations are] to be considered as part of all 
the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker 
remains in doubt after reviewing the art.”64  To 
ignore such evidence would be “jurisprudentially 
inappropriate.”65
Nevertheless, various Federal Circuit 
panels have used disparate language in portraying 
the role of secondary considerations in the Graham 
analysis and, in some cases, seemingly applied 
different standards.66  Casting the obviousness 
inquiry in terms of a prima facie obviousness 
determination—a preliminary status as opposed 
to a more settled “conclusion” or “finding”—
requiring a rebuttal of secondary considerations 
(likely a remnant of the TSM test, albeit without 
mentioning it by name), some cases continue 
to weigh the three primary considerations to 
determine if the patent challenger has made out a 
prima facie case of obviousness before moving on 
to consider evidence of objective indicia.67
The Federal Circuit reiterated the 
appropriate standard very recently in In re 
Cyclobenzaprine, seeking to clarify concededly 
“inconsistently articulated” standards vis-à-
vis secondary considerations that may have 
“understandably” confused some.68  The 
Cyclobenzaprine court mildly chastised a district 
court for reaching an obviousness “finding” prior 
to considering secondary considerations, phrasing 
the legal error as improperly “shifting the burden 
of persuasion to [the patentee].”69  The panel laid 
out a litany of cases that expressly directed courts 
to “consider all objective evidence before reaching 
an obviousness conclusion.”70  Turning then to 
cases that phrased the “obviousness analysis in 
terms of a ‘prima facie’ case which must then be 
‘rebutted’ by the patentee,”71 the court insisted 
64.  Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538 (emphasis added).
65.  Id.
66.  See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 
Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1302-05 
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
67.  Id. at 1304.
68.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1075.
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 1076 (citing Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 
654 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 
F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool 
Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Richardson–Vicks 
Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Rockwell 
Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
71.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1076 (citing 
Innovention Toys, L.L.C. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 
1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
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that such cases “should not be interpreted as 
establishing a formal burden-shifting framework” 
for three reasons: (1) the fact that objective indicia 
are considered last is not outcome-determinative 
in those cases; (2) the “prima facie”/”rebuttal” 
courts have generally clarified that fact finders 
must consider all evidence before reaching a 
determination; and (3) U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent does not support such a reading.72  
Although the Cyclobenzaprine court 
accurately observes that failure to consider 
secondary considerations is a reversible error, 
there is more to the story.  Lurking behind the 
concern of improper “burden-shifting” is the 
Federal Circuit’s internal struggle to define the 
evidentiary value of secondary considerations.
II.  Secondary conSIderatIonS In the wake  
 oF ksr: conFLIctIng aPProacheS
 a.  weIghIng the Graham FactorS  
  PoSt-ksr
A careful examination of Federal Circuit 
cases following KSR through June 201273 reveals 
that, more often than not, secondary considerations 
were summarily dismissed as insufficient74 or 
undercut through a stringent interpretation of the 
nexus requirement.75  Nonetheless, the requirement 
to consider objective indicia remains intact.  So, 
while secondary considerations must be considered 
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 
1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson 
Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, 
Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); WMS Gaming, Inc. 
v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
72.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1077-79.
73.  For a complete list of cases reviewed, see Appendix, 
available in the online version of this article at www.ipbrief.
net.  See also Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in 
Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia Following 
KSR v. Teleflex, 86 n.y.u. L. rev. 2070 (2011) (examining effect 
of KSR on subsequent Federal Circuit decisions through early 2010 
that involved secondary considerations).
74.  See, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 
1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A strong case of prima facie 
obviousness . . . cannot be overcome by a far weaker 
showing of objective indicia of nonobviousness.”); Geo. 
M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding the objective evidence of 
nonobviousness would “fail to make a difference” in light of strong 
evidence of obviousness).
75.  See, e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA 
LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
and occasionally enjoy lavish praise from the 
court,76 they rarely, if ever, seem to persuade the 
court to go against a prima facie obviousness 
determination based on the first three Graham 
factors.  In practice, courts tend to recite and rely 
on secondary considerations when finding patents 
nonobvious, but marginalize or disparage them 
when finding patents obvious and invalid.77
While the trend suggests secondary 
considerations are still “secondary” in probative 
value, there are exceptions.78  In May 2012, 
the Federal Circuit decided Mintz v. Dietz & 
Watson, Inc.79  The opinion included a lengthy 
exposition extolling the importance of secondary 
considerations in safeguarding against hindsight 
bias in after-the-fact inquiries—all en route to 
remanding to the district court.80  Likening the 
obviousness inquiry to “walk[ing] a tightrope 
blindfolded,” the Mintz court describes secondary 
considerations as “powerful tools” that “help 
inoculate the obviousness analysis against 
hindsight,” and which “help [the court] turn back 
the clock and place the claims in the context 
that led to their invention.”81  In its remand, the 
court ironically added: “In light of the following 
section . . . [finding no infringement], this court 
leaves to the district court to decide whether any 
further proceedings are necessary.”82  The claim-
dispositive finding of non-infringement did not 
deter the panel from taking advantage of the 
opportunity to make clear that objective indicia are 
highly probative of nonobviousness.
In re Cyclobenzaprine83 also envisioned a 
more persuasive role for secondary considerations.  
The intellectual thrust of Cyclobenzaprine, 
however, is telling.  The court painstakingly 
76.  See, e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 
1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expounding at length the value of 
objective indicia as a safeguard against hind-sight bias).
77.  See chISum, supra note 9.
78.  See, e.g., Mintz, 679 F.3d 1372 (expounding at length the 
value of objective indicia as a safeguard against hind-sight bias); 
In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1083-84 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(holding secondary considerations “support a nonobviousness 
finding”); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
655 F.3d 1364, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (indicating secondary 
considerations are probative); Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs. 
Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding secondary 
considerations persuasive).
79.  679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
80.  Id. at 1378-80.
81.  Id. at 1378-79.
82.  Id. at 1380.
83.  676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  See discussion supra Part 
I.G. 
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reasserts the long-standing rules regarding the 
applicable burdens of proof, production, and 
persuasion, as well as the standard of proof.84  
While a passing reading suggests the court 
is concerned about lower courts’ failures to 
consider objective indicia, a more careful analysis 
suggests the court is trying to correct inconsistent 
applications of the standards in the context of the 
nexus requirement.  This is so because the nexus 
requirement has become the instrument of choice 
for judicial analyses that undermine the probative 
value of secondary considerations.  While 
courts have (and continue to) summarily dismiss 
objective indicia as “insufficient” to rebut a 
“strong” prima facie obviousness case, more often 
they find the link between the proffered evidence 
of secondary considerations and the patent subject 
is either nonexistent, tenuous, or uncertain and, 
thus, evidence of the secondary considerations can 
be steeply discounted.
As the Federal Circuit works out the 
probative weight of objective indicia in the face 
of Supreme Court silence, the linchpin often 
lies in the nexus requirement.  The contrasting 
approaches to the nexus requirement result in 
decidedly different appraisals of the probity of 
objective indicia.  Thus, marked conflict in the 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the burdens of 
proof, persuasion, and production, alongside (at 
best) opaque distinctions between the various 
nexus tests, perpetuates contrasting appraisals of 
secondary considerations.
 B.  the nexuS requIrement
Unlike the first three Graham factors, 
secondary considerations are circumstantial 
evidence and shed light on the inquiry through 
inferences that can be drawn from the underlying 
facts.  Thus, commercial success (the most 
common secondary consideration) allows us to 
infer that the invention is nonobvious because, 
were it obvious, someone else would have 
invented it to capture the economic benefit.  
However, commentators have noted that 
commercial success may derive from several 
factors such as a aggressive marketing, ritzy 
advertising, dominant market position, etc.85  From 
84.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1075-80.
85.  Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent 
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 caL. L. rev. 
a logical standpoint, four conditions are necessary 
for the inference to hold true: (1) the commercial 
success was due to the patented invention; (2) 
the inventor knew the likelihood of commercial 
success before reaching the invention; (3) other 
prospective inventors also had this information 
and sought to take advantage; and (4) the actual 
inventor was first-in-time to succeed by an 
appreciable time margin.86
Learned Hand likewise warned against 
incautiously relying on evidence of objective 
indicia.87  The nexus requirement that the Federal 
Circuit has developed, however, involves an 
intricate dance wherein some of the oft-conflated 
burdens of production, persuasion, and proof 
switch back and forth between patentee and 
challenger.88 
805, 860 (1988). 
86.  Id. at 812 (citing Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere 
Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SuP. ct. rev. 293, 331-32, 
reprinted in 49 J. Pat. oFF. Soc’y, 282-83 (1967)).
87.  Ruben Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266, 268 
(2d Cir. 1935). 
While it is always the safest course to 
test a putative invention by what went before 
and what came after, it is easy to be misled.  
Nothing is less reliable than uncritically to 
accept its welcome by the art, even though it 
displaced what went before.  If the machine or 
composition appears shortly after some obstacle 
to its creation, technical or economic, has been 
removed, we should scrutinize its success 
jealously; if at about the same time others begin 
the same experiments in the same or nearby 
fields, or if these come to fruition soon after the 
patentee’s, the same is true.  Such a race does 
not indicate invention.  We should ask how 
old was the need; for how long could known 
materials and processes have filled it; how long 
others had unsuccessfully tried for an answer.  
If these conditions are fulfilled, success is a 
reliable touchstone.
Id.
88.  The “slipperiest” term of art—burden of proof—
encompasses two separate concepts: 
(1) Burden of production (indicating which party must come 
forward with evidence at a given point);
(2) Burden of persuasion (indicating which party loses if the 
evidence is balanced).
In addition, the concept of “standard of proof” specifies:
[The] degree of certainty by which the 
fact finder must be persuaded of a factual 
conclusion to find in favor of the party bearing 
the burden of persuasion.  In other words, the 
term “standard of proof” specifies how difficult 
it will be for the party bearing the burden of 
persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in 
its favor.  
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C.  the nexuS tango: ShIFtIng 
burdenS oF ProductIon, 
PerSuaSIon, and ProoF
In Crocs, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,89 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
long-standing rule that “[a] prima facie case of 
nexus is made when the patentee shows both that 
there is commercial success, and that the product 
that is commercially successful is the invention 
disclosed and claimed in the patent.”90  A patentee 
therefore enjoys a presumption of nexus if the 
commercially successful product is the patented 
invention.91  Of course, “[the patentee] carries the 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 & n.4 
(2011) (internal citations omitted).
89.  598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
90.  Id. at 1310-11 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 
227 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. 
Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
91.  Where the subject of the patent is only a component of 
the commercially successful product (i.e. not co-extensive with the 
product), “the patentee must show prima facie a legally sufficient 
relationship between that which is patented and that which is sold.”  
Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 
1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Traditional proof of a prima facie nexus 
in the context of a patented subcomponent of a commercially 
successful product includes “evidence that the patented feature 
yields comparative advantages” or “evidence that the patentee and 
its competitors consistently used the patented feature while varying 
other features.”  chISum, supra note 9, § 5.05.  Here again, however, 
the law is opaque and reflects the conflict in the co-extensive 
context.  See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 
1357, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that substantial evidence 
supported a jury’s verdict of nonobviousness where patent owner 
showed the necessary nexus by evidence that “the licensing fee for 
a covered product was more than cut in half immediately upon the 
expiration of the patent.”); Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 
F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding a prima facie nexus 
by relying on a survey that indicated “a statistically significant 
percentage of customers viewed the [patented subcomponent] as 
being of more value to them, and reported that the [component] was 
the very reason they purchased the device . . . and was the reason 
they were willing to pay more . . . than for one without it”).  But 
see Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010) (finding it “difficult to calculate the worth of a specific 
[component],” but concluding that the accused infringer’s inclusion 
of the component in the product, advertising of that specific feature, 
and subsequent commercial success of the product sufficed to show 
the required nexus), rev’d on other grounds, 667 F.3d 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Mar. 12, 2012); Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (presuming a nexus where the commercially successful 
merchandise “encompasses the claimed features” as well as 
unclaimed features).  Interestingly, in this non-coextensive context, 
evidence of copying buttresses evidence of commercial success.  
See Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 816 F.2d 1549, 1556 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a subcomponent 
of a commercially successful oil and gas well drilling bit—that 
was continuously copied by competitors, while other features were 
burden of demonstrating that the ‘thing . . . that is 
commercially successful is the invention disclosed 
and claimed in the patent.’”92 
Once the presumption is established, 
“the burden of coming forward with evidence 
in rebuttal shifts to the challenger.”93  Thus, 
the challenger may rebut the presumption by 
producing evidence “attributing these secondary 
considerations to causes other than the claimed 
invention” sufficient to “make a convincing case 
that those [other factors] indeed were the likely 
cause of the success.”94  The challenger may 
also attempt to prove the commercial success 
flows from unclaimed features or, alternatively, 
features that are readily available in prior art.95  In 
the absence of such evidence, the presumption 
stands.96  
If the challenger comes forward with 
evidence that suggests the commercial success 
derived not from the merits of the patented 
invention, but rather from other factors, then the 
court must consider all the evidence (including 
rebuttal evidence from the patentee) and determine 
if the challenger has met the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard of proof in order to carry their 
not, gave “rise to an inference that there is a nexus between the 
patented feature and the commercial success”).  But see Media 
Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Commercial success . . . even if unexpected, is 
not part of the ‘unexpected results’ inquiry.  An unexpected result 
must arise from combining prior art elements; commercial success 
is a separate inquiry from unexpected results.”), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 305 (2010). 
92.  J.T. Eaton, 106 F.3d at 1571 (citing Demaco Corp. v. F. 
Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)).  
93.  Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1311 (citing Demaco, 851 F.2d 
1387).
94.  Id.; see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 
F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95.  In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“Where the offered secondary consideration actually results 
from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the 
claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.”); 
see also Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (“[A]ll the evidence was to the effect that [the invention’s] 
commercial popularity was due to . . . a feature not claimed.  Thus, 
the jury was not entitled to draw the inference that the success of 
[the device] was due to the merits of the claimed invention.  Nor 
could the jury, from the bare evidence of units sold and gross 
receipts, draw the inference that the popularity of the [device] 
was due to the merits of the invention.”); In re Vamco Mach. & 
Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting 
that, because success may be due entirely to improvements or 
modifications made by others, commercial success must flow from 
the functions and advantages disclosed or inherent in the patent 
specification to be relevant).
96.  Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1311.
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burden of persuasion.97  The Cyclobenzaprine 
court, pointing to the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
Partnership,98 clarified that “clear and convincing 
evidence”—meaning “every reasonable doubt 
should be resolved against [the challenger]”99—
governs the entire validity dispute and the burden 
of persuasion never leaves the challenger.100   In 
sum, the challenger bears “the heavy burden”101 
of proving beyond “every reasonable doubt” that 
the subject of the patent did not even contribute 
to the commercial success of the product.102  If 
the challenger fails to win this uphill battle, the 
patentee may rely on evidence of commercial 
success, however probative, to support a finding of 
nonobviousness.
Further complicating the footwork of the 
nexus tango, patentees often elect to offer evidence 
of objective indicia including evidence that a 
nexus exists.  After all, the patentees are seeking to 
rebut any possible prima facie case of obviousness. 
Additionally, trial courts often impose discovery 
obligations on patentees to be the first to produce 
such evidence.  Moreover, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 611(a),103 patentees may also be required 
to present this evidence as part of their case in 
chief.  Nonetheless, these realities do not alter who 
bears the burden of persuasion (the challenger), 
or the standard of proof (clear and convincing 
evidence).104
D. conFLIct wIthIn the FederaL  
97.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 
(2011) (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 
1, 8 (1934)); see also In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1078 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242) (applying “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard of proof in the obviousness inquiry).
98.  i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246.
99.  Id. at 2247 (quoting Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & 
Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937)).
100.  See In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1078 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (citing i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242) (applying “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard of proof in the obviousness inquiry).
101.  i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246.
102.  Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[The challenger] had the burden of 
disproving that the [subject of the patent] contributed to the success 
of the invention, and its own brief undermines its argument, by 
conceding the benefits of . . . [the subject of the patent].”).
103.  Rule 611(a) affords wide discretion and encourages the 
court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of . . 
. presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective 
for determining the truth; [and] (2) avoid wasting time . . . .”  Fed. 
r. evId. 611(a).  
104.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1078 & n. 5 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).
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  cIrcuIt over aPPLyIng the   
  Standard
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has 
not always been pellucid on burden shifting in 
the objective indicia nexus tango.  Just months 
after the Crocs decision, another Federal Circuit 
panel in Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram 
Payment Systems, Inc.,105 took a different 
tack: “[o]ur case law clearly requires that the 
patentee must establish a nexus between the 
evidence of commercial success and the patented 
invention.”106  The MoneyGram court overturned 
the lower court’s JMOL in favor of the patentee 
(Western Union), which largely relied on objective 
indicia.107  Despite conceding that “[the patentee] 
had been transferring billions of dollars” through 
its patented “formless money transfer systems,”108 
the MoneyGram court found no prima facie 
nexus but, rather, held that Western Union (the 
patentee) “failed to present any relevant evidence 
proving a nexus.”109  The court seemed to place 
the burden of persuasion squarely on the patentee, 
but then found the evidence lacking.  Ironically, 
the court conceded that Western Union introduced 
testimony from an employee “explaining how 
the [patented] system . . . enabled dramatic 
growth of Western Union’s business.”110  But 
conspicuously absent was discussion of evidence 
submitted by the challenger to rebut a presumption 
of nexus, suggesting the court never applied the 
presumption.  
The MoneyGram court cited In re 
Huang,111 where the court affirmed a holding 
of obviousness by the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO).  It is worth noting that the 
patent prosecution context is different from the 
litigation context; the former inquiry is about 
patentability, the latter about validity.112  Moreover, 
105.  626 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106.  Id. at 1372-73 (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)).
107.  Id. at 1373-74.
108.  Id. at 1372.
109.  Id. at 1373.
110.  Id. 
111.  100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
112.  The MoneyGram court seems to conflate these two 
contexts, but other panels have taken a similar approach.  See, 
e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.2d 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussed in depth infra Part II.E.); Tyco 
Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 642 F.3d 1370, 1372-
73 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 
the prosecution-patentability context involves 
different shifting burdens.113  Nonetheless, the 
Huang court noted that “[commercial] success is 
relevant in the obviousness context only if there 
is proof that the sales were a direct result of the 
unique characteristics of the claimed invention—
as opposed to other economic and commercial 
factors unrelated to the quality of the patented 
subject matter.”114  Once again, the court noted 
that “many units . . . sold” and, because the 
units were the subject of the patent, there was 
no issue with respect to being coextensive.115  
But the court found no prima facie nexus.116  
Rather, it required “some factual evidence that 
demonstrates the nexus between the sales and 
the claimed invention—for example, an affidavit 
from the purchaser explaining that the product 
was purchased due to the claimed features.”117  
This higher burden applied by the Huang court 
likewise animated the MoneyGram court, rightly 
or wrongly, to impose a higher burden on the 
patentee.
Another recent case, Wm. Wrigley Jr. 
Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC,118 illustrates 
the ongoing conflict.  The Wrigley case involved 
a storied chewing gum maker’s patent for a 
“cooling system” (a combination of menthol with 
another chemical) that provides its chewing gums 
with an enhanced cooling sensation.  Wrigley’s 
competitor, Cadbury, was concerned about losing 
market share after a series of internal reports 
examined Wrigley’s formula and found it superior.  
Cadbury, the reports revealed, decided to copy 
several aspects of the formula, including the 
superior cooling system.  Examining the evidence 
of commercial success raised by Wrigley, the 
majority agreed that Wrigley had “not established 
a sufficient nexus . . . [b]ecause the evidence 
does not show that the success of Wrigley’s 
product was directly attributable to [the patented 
combination].”119  The majority’s opinion is devoid 
of discussion about the presumption of nexus, a 
point the dissent criticizes.120  The dissent also 
392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
113.  In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1080 & n.7 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).
114.  In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
115.  See discussion supra note 91.
116.  In re Huang, 100 F.3d at 139-40.
117.  Id. at 140.
118.  683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
119.  Id. at 1364.
120.  Id. at 1369-70 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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notes that internal Cadbury records indicated that 
“[Wrigley’s] cooling technology was positively 
correlated with increased overall liking and 
also with flavor and cooling intensity at [five] 
minutes and ten minutes”121 and also identified 
the patented combination as “key drivers for 
liking.”122  While the Wrigley opinion could be 
read as suggesting that commercial success must 
be due only to the patented invention, it seems, 
rather, the court sought unequivocal evidence 
showing the commercial success was specifically 
and directly attributable to the patented subject.123  
In other words, the evidence must demonstrate 
the patented component was a but-for cause 
of commercial success.  Notwithstanding the 
“positive correlat[ion],”124 the Wrigley majority 
interpreted the list of factors cited in the internal 
Cadbury reports as all being possible contributors 
to commercial success, but none (including the 
patented combination) as being a necessary 
condition.  
The Wrigley majority also suggests 
the commercial success nexus is lacking 
because “the evidence does not show” that the 
commercial success was due to Wrigley’s patented 
combination, as opposed to another similar 
combination, which the majority deemed prior 
art.125  To the extent the majority opinion suggests 
that showing the nexus requires showing that 
your product was successful and that it would 
not have been successful if you used the prior art 
technology, the majority could have cited (but 
did not) to In re Huai-Hung Kao:126 “if it is not 
established that the [subject of the patent] . . . 
causes commercial success where the prior art 
[ ] would not, then it will be difficult to show 
121.  Id. at 1369.
122.  Id.
123.  Id. at 1363-64 (majority opinion) (“Wrigley has not 
established a sufficient nexus . . . [where] Cadbury’s internal 
study of Wrigley’s product showed that it differed . . . in several 
ways that could have contributed to the commercial success of 
Wrigley’s gum.  [Thus,] the evidence does not show that the success 
of Wrigley’s product was directly attributable to [the patented 
combination].”)
124.  Id. at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting).
125.  Id. at 1363-64 (majority opinion).
126.  639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Although In re Huai-
Hung Kao is an appeal from the PTO obviousness determination 
(i.e. the patent prosecution or “patentability” context), the Wrigley 
majority seems to apply the precise principle.  Moreover, the 
Moneygram court, among others, has pointed to patent-prosecution 
cases as illustrative of law in the litigation or “validity” context.  
See cases cited supra note 112.
the required nexus.”127  The Wrigley majority 
concluded that prior art disclosed the effect of 
combining menthol with another chemical similar 
to Wrigley’s patented combination.128  This “prior 
art” was the subject of an earlier Cadbury patent.  
The majority therefore looked to Wrigley for 
evidence of unexpected results significantly above 
and beyond the known effect and for evidence 
that the unexpected results drove the commercial 
success.129  Here again, however, the evidence 
pointed to a variety of factors (e.g., higher 
sweetener levels, gum base, filler levels, etc.), 
potentially only some of which may have driven 
commercial success.130  In the eyes of the majority, 
Wrigley failed to prove that the unexpected 
difference between using Cadbury’s chemical and 
using their own was a necessary condition to the 
commercial success of Wrigley’s gums.
Moving through each nexus inquiry, 
the Wrigley majority unmistakably requires 
compelling evidence from the patentee, suggesting 
the majority shifted the burden of proof to the 
patentee131 and seemingly applied the “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard of proof as 
well.  Thus, much like the MoneyGram court, the 
Wrigley majority portrays the shifting burdens of 
proof vis-à-vis the commercial success nexus as 
an uncomplicated two-step (first the challenger, 
then the patentee), rather than an artful tango with 
oscillating burdens. 
 E.  the nexuS teSt(S)?
The Federal Circuit has not always made 
clear distinctions between the nexus test for the 
various types of objective indicia.132  Indeed, 
there is significant overlap.  For example, in the 
context of a commercially successful product 
with a patented subcomponent (i.e., the non-
coextensive context), evidence of consistent 
127.  In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d at 1069.
128.  Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1362.
129.  Id. at 1363.  The overlap of unexpected results and 
commercial success in not unique.  See discussion infra Part II.E. 
130.  Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1363-64.
131.  The dissent (Newman, J.) accuses the majority of 
improperly shifting the burden.  See id. at 1367-68 (Newman, J., 
dissenting).
132.  But see Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck 
Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
305 (2010) (“Commercial success . . . even if unexpected, is not 
part of the ‘unexpected results’ inquiry.  An unexpected result must 
arise from combining prior art elements; commercial success is a 
separate inquiry from unexpected results . . . .”). 
57American University Intellectual Property Brief
copying of the patented feature, while varying 
other features, gives rise to the inference that a 
nexus exists between the patented subcomponent 
and the commercially successful product.133  
Thus, evidence of targeted copying may buttress 
evidence of commercial success.  While untargeted 
copying (i.e., wholesale duplication) might not 
give credence to evidence of commercial success 
in the non-coextensive context, it is unclear 
whether it would be probative of evidence of 
a different secondary consideration—namely, 
copying.  Here, again, Wrigley is illustrative of 
the distinction (or lack thereof) between the nexus 
tests.  
Like commercial success, evidence of 
copying also requires evidence of a nexus.134  
Furthermore, “[n]ot every competing product 
that arguably falls within the scope of a patent 
is evidence of copying.  Otherwise every 
infringement suit would automatically confirm 
the nonobviousness of the patent.”135  The “factual 
determination as to what the exact reason for the 
copying was” is the heart of the copying nexus.136  
Furthermore, “copying requires the replication 
of a specific product . . . demonstrated either 
through internal documents, direct evidence . . 
. or access to, and substantial similarity to, the 
patented product (as opposed to the patent).”137  
In addition, evidence of failed attempts by the 
accused infringer to develop the patented invention 
(or an equivalent) will increase the weight given 
to copying as evidence of nonobviousness,138 but 
“the patentee [need not] prove that the customer 
knew of and desired every attribute set out in the 
patent document.”139  Finally, “the purpose of 
133.  Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 816 F.2d 
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a 
subcomponent of a commercially successful oil and gas well 
drilling bit—that was continuously copied by competitors, while 
other features were not, gave rise to an inference that “there is a 
nexus between the patented feature and the commercial success”).  
See generally discussion supra note 91.
134.  Ecolochem Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co. 227 F.3d 1361, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“[M]ore than the mere fact of copying by an accused 
infringer is needed to make that action significant to a determination 
of the obviousness issue.”)).  
135.  Iron Grip Barbell Co. Inc. v. USA Sports Inc., 392 F.3d 
1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136.  Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1380. 
137.  Iron Grip, 392 F.3d at 1325 (internal citations omitted).  
138.  Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 
622 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Thus, evidence of failure by others—a 
distinct secondary consideration of its own—may buttress evidence 
of copying.  
139.  Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 
considering copying as a secondary consideration 
in the context of obviousness is not to read the law 
of trade secrets into patent law.”140  As a result, the 
extent of copying is relevant to the obviousness 
inquiry only to the extent it (1) reveals a 
substantially similar product, and (2) the reason 
for the copying was related to the merits of the 
claimed invention (as opposed to other reasons).
The Wrigley majority affirmed the district 
court’s summary judgment against Wrigley (the 
patentee) despite evidence, including a series of 
internal records, indicating blatant copying by 
Cadbury (the accused infringer).141  Once again, 
the majority agreed with the district court that 
Wrigley “had failed to establish the requisite 
nexus between [the] copying and the merits 
of the claimed invention.”142  In the majority’s 
view, because Cadbury “sought to reformulate its 
products to match Wrigley’s products, [including 
not just the patented cooling system, but also 
the sweeteners and their respective levels],” the 
evidence of copying suggested an industry with 
rampant wholesale copying, but did not infer the 
cooling system was nonobvious.143  
The Wrigley majority does not seem 
to dispute that Cadbury sought to create a 
substantially similar product—the first prong 
of the copying nexus test.  Rather, because 
Cadbury copied several elements of the Wrigley 
product, the majority suggests Cadbury’s reason 
for copying—the second prong of the copying 
nexus test—reflected the “accepted practices 
in the industry” and not necessarily a desire to 
duplicate the merits of the claimed invention.144  
The majority’s concern over erroneously inferring 
nonobviousness based on evidence of copying is 
not new.  While the Federal Circuit has observed 
that evidence of “wholesale copying” combined 
with “repeated failures” “could be determinative 
on the issue of obviousness,”145 as early as 1985, 
the Federal Circuit questioned the inferential 
power of evidence of copying146 and more recently 
679 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
140.  Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d 
1202, 1230 (D. Nev. 2008).
141.  Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 
F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
142.  Id. at 1363.
143.  Id. at 1364.
144.  Id.
145.  Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 
F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
146.  The Wrigley majority’s view seems very reflective of the 
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dubbed it “only equivocal evidence of non-
obviousness.”147  Like most objective indicia, the 
weight to be accorded lies in the strength of the 
nexus.  Nonetheless, the majority seems to conflate 
the test of a commercial success nexus with that 
of a copying nexus (assuming, of course, there is a 
distinction).
While the Federal Circuit has weighed 
whether widespread copying of a patented 
subcomponent is evidence of a nexus between the 
patented feature and the commercial success,148 
it has not done so in the context of evidence of 
copying, perhaps because that proposition is 
logically untenable.  When an industry copies 
a patented subcomponent (while varying other 
features), it gives rise to an inference that a 
nexus between the patent subject and evidence 
of commercial success exists.149  But it does not 
follow that industry-wide copying of all or many 
of the features (i.e., not “varying other features”) 
of a product is direct evidence that the commercial 
concerns expressed in Cable Electric: 
Rather than supporting a conclusion of 
obviousness, copying could have occurred out 
of a general lack of concern for patent property, 
in which case it weighs neither for nor against 
the nonobviousness of a specific patent. It may 
have occurred out of contempt for the specific 
patent in question, only arguably demonstrating 
obviousness, or for the ability or willingness of 
the patentee financially or otherwise to enforce 
the patent right, which would call for deeper 
inquiry. Even widespread copying could weigh 
toward opposite conclusions, depending on the 
attitudes existing toward patent property and the 
accepted practices in the industry in question.  It 
is simplistic to assert that copying per se should 
bolster the validity of a patent.
Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), overruled en banc on other 
grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. 
Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding copying was 
an admission of mechanical superiority, but “not strong evidence 
of nonobviousness,” notwithstanding protracted failure to design a 
similar non-infringing device). 
147.  Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l, LLC, 
618 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. 
Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
148.  See Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 816 F.2d 
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a 
subcomponent of a commercially successful oil and gas well 
drilling bit—that was continuously copied by competitors, while 
other features were not, gave rise to an inference that “there is a 
nexus between the patented feature and the commercial success”).  
See generally discussion supra note 91.
149.  Hughes Tool, 816 F.2d at 1556.  See generally discussion 
supra note 91.
success is therefore totally unrelated to the 
patented feature (i.e., a commercial success nexus 
is lacking).  Moreover, it does not follow that the 
reasons for copying—the second prong of the 
copying nexus test—did not include the merits of 
the claimed invention.  In fact, no Federal Circuit 
panel has expressed the test for the copying nexus 
in this way—until Wrigley, that is.  In this sense, 
Wrigley could be seen as breaking new ground or, 
depending on how you look at it, perpetuating a 
long-standing divide (or lack thereof) between the 
nexus tests. 
The Wrigley majority’s lack of distinction 
between the nexus tests (e.g., for commercial 
success, copying, long-felt need, etc.) could be 
interpreted to mean the nexus test is functionally 
equivalent for all types of objective indicia with 
only minor variations, rather than a separate test 
for each objective indicia.  If the nexus inquiry is 
but one test, the Wrigley majority’s demand for a 
more direct and convincing showing150 to establish 
a prima facie copying nexus in a non-coextensive 
context may be apposite.  On the other hand, 
even if there is but one unified nexus inquiry, the 
Wrigley majority’s position could be seen151 as 
contravening Federal Circuit precedent152 vis-à-
vis the nexus requirement in the non-coextensive 
context.153   
In sum, the contrasting approaches to the 
nexus requirement facilitate disparate appraisals 
of the probative value of objective indicia.  Panels 
that apply the nexus presumption and hold 
150.  See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 
1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding a “prima facie nexus” by relying 
on a survey that indicated “a statistically significant percentage 
of customers viewed the [patented subcomponent] as being of 
more value to them, and reported that the [component] was the 
very reason they purchased the device . . . and was the reason they 
were willing to pay more . . . than for one without it . . . .”).  See 
generally discussion supra note 91.
151.  The dissent (Newman, J.) certainly accuses the majority 
of “depart[ing] from the routine correct law of obviousness . . . .”  
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J. dissenting).
152.  Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding it “difficult to calculate the worth of a 
specific [component],” but concluding that the accused infringer’s 
inclusion of the component in the product, advertising of that 
specific feature, and subsequent commercial success of the product 
sufficed to show the required nexus), rev’d on other grounds, 667 
F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Mar. 12, 2012); see also 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 
F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (presuming a nexus where the 
commercially successful merchandise “encompasses the claimed 
features” as well as unclaimed features).  See generally discussion 
supra note 91.
153.  See generally supra note 91. 
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challengers to the standard of proof, paying close 
attention to which party bears what burden, can 
easily come to a different conclusion vis-à-vis 
secondary consideration than panels that do not 
pay as close attention.  Thus, marked conflict in 
the Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the burdens 
of proof, persuasion, and production alongside 
opaque distinctions between the various nexus 




Although very recent cases hint at room 
for change, that clear pattern following KSR 
sees a rather “unpersuasive” role for objective 
indicia.  Far from routinely dispositive, secondary 
considerations garner significant attention when 
the initial prima facie obviousness determination 
is weak, suggesting courts take a “tip the scales” 
approach to objective indicia.  Moreover, even 
where patentees bring mountains of evidence of 
objective indicia, courts have employed a rigid 
interpretation of the nexus requirement to whittle 
down the evidence to a proverbial molehill.  
The TSM test, whether explicitly invoked (and 
“flexibly” applied) or not, continues to give 
shape to the judicial inquiry on nonobviousness 
by outlining the process as a prima facie 
obviousness determination (based on the primary 
considerations) requiring a rebuttal of secondary 
considerations.  Given the current trends, it seems 
secondary considerations are still “secondary” in 
status in the wake of KSR.
The inferential probity of objective 
considerations is not unassailable, and the 
universally approved nexus requirement can 
be an important check.  But divergent strains 
of conflicting case law undermine the bedrock 
principle of stare decisis and are the ilk of poor 
legal policy.  While the Supreme Court’s decision 
in i4i154 probably should have settled more 
questions about the proper burdens in the patent 
litigation context, it failed to unify the Federal 
Circuit’s approach in the context of secondary 
considerations and the nonobviousness inquiry.  
As the conflicting approaches to secondary 
considerations persist, the opportunity presents 
itself to clarify the legal standard vis-à-vis the 
nexus requirement.  Wrigley is such an opportunity 
154.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 (2011).
because the case highlights the conflict over 
the rules governing the parties’ burdens and the 
distinctions (if any) between the nexus tests; 
both of which, in conjunction, obfuscate the 
nexus inquiry.155  No matter whether the Supreme 
Court views the proper nexus test as a burden-
switching tango or a basic two-step, resolving the 
inconsistency with some finality would fulfill a 
tremendously vital role of law from a public policy 
standpoint.
Given the persistent conflict, it seems the 
Federal Circuit bench is not of one mind on these 
questions, casting doubt on the usefulness of an 
en banc review.  Moreover, Wrigley presents a 
swath of objective indicia, affording the Supreme 
Court the opportunity to finally give more 
instruction as to the weight accorded to secondary 
considerations and how that should factor into 
a nonobviousness analysis.156  By taking that 
opportunity, the Court could also ameliorate the 
persisting influence of the TSM test, flexibly 
applied or not, which perpetuates the suspect 
notion of inherent analytical distinctions between 
primary and secondary considerations, as well 
as the procedurally expedient, but error-inducing 
structure of the inquiry. 
155.  See Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1356.
156.  Id.
